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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Johnson appeals from the district court's order summarily
dismissing his second successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Idaho Court of Appeals previously described the facts of the
underlying case as follows:
The facts of this case show a very gruesome attack carried
out jointly by Petersen and Johnson over a two-hour period. In
inteNiews conducted by investigators and in statements to the
court, Petersen and Johnson each attributed the most violent acts
to the other. Both denied performing several of the acts that
eventually lead [sic] to the death of their victims and accused the
other of committing those acts. The record, according to Petersen,
sets forth the following scenario.
During the early morning hours of September 14, 1993,
Petersen and Johnson entered the home of Ricky Lee Mangum
and Connie Allen, whom they had met briefly for the first time
earlier in the evening. Shortly after entering the home, a struggle
ensued involving both Petersen and Johnson, and Mangum and
Allen. Mangum was viciously attacked with a tire iron resulting in
bruises on both hands and gaping lacerations extending deep into
the skull. After Mangum collapsed to the floor, Petersen tied
Mangum's arms and legs behind his back using electrical cords.
Demanding Mangum's money, Petersen took eight dollars from
Mangum's wallet which was in a vehicle parked outside the
residence. Mangum's throat was repeatedly slashed by Petersen
and Johnson as he lay unclothed and tied up on the kitchen floor.
Mangum's death resulted from the laceration of the carotid artery
and the right jugular vein. Although Petersen admitted to slashing
Mangum's throat, causing one of the several smaller lacerations, he
denied making the deep, gaping cut which killed Mangum.
Allen was restrained by Johnson while Petersen tied her up with a
shirt. She was taken into the bedroom where she was raped by
Petersen and Johnson. Johnson also sodomized her. After being
raped, Allen's throat was slashed several times, severing the
1

trachea and the right and left jugular veins. Believing Allen was
dead, Johnson and Petersen dragged her body into the bathroom
to destroy any evidence that would connect them to the rape. At
some point Allen revived and began to struggle. She was placed in
the tub which Petersen had filled with water. Allen was then
severely beaten with a tire iron fracturing numerous bones and
lacerating and puncturing her skin. Petersen tied up Allen again
using an electrical cord, and then held her head under the water in
the tub. Allen died as a result of the severing of her right and left
jugular veins. However, contributing factors were fresh water
aspiration asphyxiation and a severe blow to the head.
Before leaving the residence, Petersen and Johnson
attempted to wipe up the blood and destroy any evidence. In
addition to the eight dollars taken from Mangum's wallet, six dollars
were stolen from Allen's purse and a jar of change was also
removed from the house. The tire iron and some bloody clothing
were thrown into the Big Wood River by Petersen and Johnson as
they left the scene.
State v. Johnson, 1 127 Idaho 279, 280-281, 899 P.2d 989, 990-991 (Ct. App.
1995).
Pursuant to an I.C.R. 11 written plea agreement, Johnson pied guilty to
two counts of first degree murder.

See Johnson v. State, 1997 Unpublished

Opinion No. 617, Docket No. 23177, p.1 (Idaho App., July 10, 1997). The district
court imposed concurrent fixed life sentences. See id. Johnson filed no direct
appeal.

See id.

In his initial post-conviction petition, Johnson raised "ten

assignments of error regarding

his counsel's representation during trial

preparation and plea negotiations." See id., pp.1-2. The district court summarily
dismissed the petition, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal.

llh, pp.2-8.

While Johnson's name remained in the title of the case, this appeal concerned
Peterson's challenge to his sentence. Johnson did not challenge his conviction
or sentence on direct appeal.
1
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Approximately 12 years later, Johnson filed a pro se successive petition
for post-conviction relief. (R., Vol. I, pp.21-27.) The petition was based upon an
affidavit Johnson received from Peterson, in which Peterson alleged that he was
solely responsible for the murders, and that "[a]nything [Johnson] did that knight
[sic] was because I forced him to and I made it very clear I would kill him if he
didn't do what I said." (R., Vol. I, pp.21-27, 39-40.) Peterson also asserted that
he provided this information to the prosecutor, police, and his defense attorneys
prior to Johnson's guilty pleas, but that the state pressured him into changing his
story to implicate Johnson.

(R., Vol. I, pp.39-40.)

Based upon this affidavit,

Johnson asserted: (1) the state withheld Peterson's confession in violation of
Brady v. Maryland, 837 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) Peterson's confession constituted
new evidence that required vacation of the conviction or sentence; and (3) his
initial post-conviction counsel was ineffective for withholding and not utilizing
Peterson's confession, and due to a conflict of interest. (R., Vol. I, p.22.)
The district court summarily dismissed Johnson's successive petition.
(R., Vol. I, pp.192-215.) The court found that Johnson failed to allege facts that, if

true, demonstrated he was entitled to relief as to any of his claims. (R., Vol. I,
pp.202, 206-213.) The district court also concluded that Johnson failed to show
sufficient reason to justify the filing of the successive petition in two respects: (1)
the petition was untimely because Johnson failed to file it within a reasonable
time of becoming aware of Peterson's affidavit; and (2) Johnson failed to
demonstrate that his post-conviction counsel's performance was deficient. (R.,
Vol. I, pp.202-206.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal and the
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district court's conclusion that the petition was untimely. Johnson v. State, 2011
Unpublished Opinion No. 574, Docket No. 37378 (Idaho App., August 8, 2011).
The Court did not reach the merits of Johnson's claims, or Johnson's argument
that ineffective assistance of his initial post-conviction counsel justified his
successive petition. See id.
Johnson then filed a second pro se successive petition for post-conviction
relief. 2 (R., Vol. I, pp.5-20.) Johnson raised the same claims he asserted in his
first successive petition, and also asserted that he received ineffective assistance
from his successive post-conviction counsel and his successive post-conviction
appellate counsel. (Id.) Further, Johnson appeared to argue that his successive
post-conviction counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to adequately argue that his
first successive petition was timely constituted "sufficient reason" to justify the
filing of his second successive petition. (Id.)
To support this latter argument, Johnson submitted additional affidavits
and evidence regarding his efforts to timely to file the first successive petition,
and evidence of communications between Johnson and his first successive
petition counsel.

(R., Vol. I, pp.28-38, 56-62, 95-100.)

The district court

appointed counsel to represent Johnson "for the limited purpose of addressing
the issue of res judicata or law of the case as concerns timeliness of a
successive petition for post-conviction relief and whether there is sufficient

2

In the interim, the Idaho Supreme Court granted Johnson's petition for review
from the Court of Appeal's opinion affirming the district court's summary dismissal
of his first successive petition. (See R., Vol. I, p.223; Vol. 11, pp.265-268, 285.)
However, after oral argument, the Court ruled that the petition had been
improvidently granted and dismissed it. (See id.)
4

reason to allow a second successive petition for post-conviction when the court
has

previously

determined

such

claims

were

untimely

asserted."

(Augmentation: 3 4/22/13 "Order Re: Appointment of Counsel.")
After providing notice, the district court summarily dismissed Johnson's
second successive post-conviction petition, concluding that Johnson failed to
demonstrate sufficient reason to justify the filing of the petition.
pp.283-298.)

(R., Vol. II,

The court also denied Johnson's subsequent motion for

reconsideration. (R., Vol. II, pp.319-327.) Johnson timely appealed. (R., Vol. II,
pp.328-330.)

The Idaho Supreme Court granted Johnson's motion to augment the appellate
record with the district court's order appointing counsel and several other
documents that were not included in the clerk's record. (9/10/14 Order.)
3
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ISSUES
Johnson states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the
prior post-conviction
counsel's
affirmative
misrepresentations and Mr. Johnson's personal efforts to
remedy counsel's deficiencies provide sufficient reason
under I.C. § 19-4908 to justify a successive post-conviction
relief petition?

2.

Must this case be remanded because the district court erred
in concluding that Mr. Johnson had not produced sufficient
evidence to establish an issue of fact as to whether his
successive petition was filed within a reasonable time and
the only issues counsel was permitted to address and that
the district court considered concerned timeliness?

(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Johnson failed to show that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his second successive post-conviction petition?

6

ARGUMENT
Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Second Successive Post-Conviction Petition

A.

Introduction
Johnson contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his

second successive post-conviction petition.

(See generally Appellant's brief.)

However, Johnson's argument that the filing of his second successive petition
was justified by alleged ineffective assistance of his first post-conviction petition
counsel is precluded by the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in Murphy v.
State, 156 Idaho 389, _ , 327 P.3d 365, 367 (2014) (reh'g denied).

Further,

even notwithstanding Murphy. Johnson has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to
relief.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).

C.

Johnson Failed To Show Sufficient Reason To File A Second Successive
Post-Conviction Petition
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act.

I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.

A petition for post-conviction relief

initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the
7

burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho
518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676,678,662
P.2d 548, 550 (1983).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief, in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative, if the applicant "has not presented evidence making a prima facie case
as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the
burden of proof." Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).
Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary
hearing, deemed true. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190
(1975). However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's
conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001);
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
Also, because the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the
event of an evidentiary hearing, summary disposition is permissible, despite the
possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn from the facts, for the court alone
will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences. State v.
Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008). That is, the judge in a
post-conviction action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion for summary disposition but rather is free to arrive at the
most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.

8

~

A successive petition for post-conviction relief is generally not permissible.
I.C. § 19-4908 (claims not raised in initial post-conviction proceedings generally
waived).

Only in cases where the petitioner can show "sufficient reason" why

claims were "inadequately presented in the original case," may he have the
opportunity to re-litigate them. Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975,
978 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted); see also I.C. § 19-4908. An analysis of
whether "sufficient reason" exists to file a successive petition includes an analysis
of whether the petition was filed within a "reasonable time" after the petitioner's
discovery of the factual basis for the claim. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900,
904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). "In determining what a reasonable time is for
filing a successive petition, [the court] will simply consider it on a case-by-case
basis, as has been done in capital cases." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174
P.3d at 875.
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court overruled prior precedent and held
that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel cannot constitute "sufficient
reason" for filing a successive petition under I.C. § 19-4908. Murphy, 156 Idaho
at _ , 327 P.3d at 368-371. The Court reasoned that because, as the United
States Supreme Court has recognized, there is no constitutional right to an
attorney in state post-conviction proceedings,

a petitioner cannot claim

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings, even as a
means of attempting to overcome state procedural hurdles.

~

In this case, Johnson argued that his first successive petition counsel was
ineffective in failing to adequately argue that his first successive petition was
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timely, and that this ineffectiveness constituted "sufficient reason" under I.C. § 194908 to justify the filing of a second successive petition.

(R., Vol. I, pp.5-19.)

Johnson offered no other justification for the filing of the second successive
petition.

(See id.)

Because Murphy precludes the argument upon which the

validity of Johnson's second successive petition relies, he cannot show error.
On appeal, Johnson acknowledges Murphy, but attempts to limit its
application to this case in several ways. First, Johnson notes that if ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel can't give rise to "sufficient reason" under
I.C. § 19-4908, then the legislature's use of that language would be rendered a
nullity unless there is

some other way to show such reason. (Appellant's brief,

p.6.) Johnson argues that other such ways include ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel that goes "beyond simple ineffective assistance of counsel."
(Appellant's brief, p.7.)

Johnson asserts that despite fully informing his first

successive petition counsel of the efforts Johnson made to file a timely petition,
counsel "continually led him to believe that the petition would be amended and
failed to amend the petition," and then ultimately failed to adequately argue the
timeliness issue to the district court.

(Id.) Essentially, Johnson argues that his

first successive post-conviction counsel's performance was so egregious that
Murphy does not apply.
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently rejected a nearly identical argument
in Lopez v. State, _

P.3d _ , 2014 WL 5347372. (Ct. App. 2014) (petition for

10

review pending.)4 Lopez argued that, even in light of Murphy, some claims must
still constitute "sufficient reason" to file successive petitions lest the legislature's
use of that language be rendered meaningless.

kl at *3.

Lopez reasoned that

the "absence of any meaningful representation," i.e., particularly egregious
counsel performance, must therefore constitute a "sufficient reason" under I.C. §
19-4908.

kl

In rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeals recognized that the

Idaho Supreme Court "squarely and unequivocally addressed this issue, leaving
no room for this Court to craft an exception."

kl

(citing Murphy, 156 Idaho at

391, 327 P.3d at 367.) The Court also recognized that there remained avenues
to demonstrate "sufficient reason" - such as where there is newly discovered
evidence. 5

kl

Additionally, Johnson argues that because Murphy had not been issued at
the time his second successive petition was before the district court, he
attempted to show that his counsel was ineffective in order to demonstrate
"sufficient reason" to justify the filing of the second successive petition.
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) Therefore, Johnson reasons, should this Court find that
Murphy precludes his argument, the case should be remanded to allow him the
opportunity to show his second successive petition was justified by some other

4

Johnson did not have the benefit of the Court of Appeals' opinion in Lopez
when he wrote his brief.

Additionally, in Parvin v. State, _ P.3d _ , 2014 WL 5346783 (Ct. App. 2014)
(petition for review pending), the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that "unique
and compelling circumstances," including particularly egregious attorney conduct,
can still, post-Murphy. be the basis of an I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief from
judgment when filed in the course of a petitioner's initial post-conviction
proceeding (citing Ebyv. State, 148 ldaho731, 734,228 P.3d 998, 1001 (2010)).
5
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"sufficient reason." (Id.) However, in both Parvin and Lopez, the district court
summarily successive dismissed post-conviction petitions prior to the issuance of
Murphy. 6 See Parvin,_ P.3d _ , 2014 WL 5346783 at *4; Lopez,_ P.3d _ ,
2014 WL 5347372 at *4. The Court of Appeals allowed both Parvin and Lopez to
supplement the appellate briefing in light of Murphy, but ultimately applied
Murphy in both cases.

In both cases, as in the present case, the petitioners

relied entirely on claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel to
attempt to justify the filing of successive petitions, and were unable to assert
sufficient alternative reasons in the course of appellate briefing.

kl

While

Johnson requests the opportunity to present a different "sufficient reason" below,
he has not asserted what such a reason might be. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.)
Certainly, none of the evidence regarding his efforts to timely file the first
successive petition were "newly discovered" by Johnson at the time he filed his
second successive petition. Because Murphy precludes the argument on which
Johnson's appeal relies, he cannot show error.
Further, even notwithstanding Murphy, Johnson's second successive postconviction petition was barred. Idaho Code § 19-4908 permits a petitioner to file
a successive petition where there is "sufficient reason" to justify raising a new
ground or claim. It does not permit petitioners to re-litigate prior determinations

that their successive petition was untimely. As the district court recognized, such
arguments are precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. See State v. Rhoades,

6

And of course, in Murphy itself, the Idaho Supreme Court applied its holding in
that case to the district court's summary dismissal of Murphy's successive postconviction petition.
12

134 Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481, 482 (2000) (The doctrine of res judicata
prevents re-litigation of issues that have been previously decided in a final
judgment or decision in an action between the same litigants.). In this case, the
district court already determined that the first successive petition and the claims
raised within were untimely (R., Vol. I, pp.202-206), and the Idaho Court of
Appeals affirmed this determination.
57 4, Docket No. 37378.

Johnson, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No.

Idaho Code § 19-4908 and the doctrine of res judicata

preclude Johnson from now attempting to re-litigate this determination with new
arguments or previously-known evidence.
Finally, even notwithstanding Murphy, and even if a successive postconviction counsel's alleged ineffectiveness in failing to adequately argue that the
first successive petition was timely could theoretically constitute sufficient reason
for the filing of a second successive petition, the district court correctly concluded
that Johnson failed to demonstrate such grounds in this case.

For this

conclusion, the state adopts the district court's rationale, as stated in its
Memorandum Decision. (R., Vol. II, pp.283-298.)
The Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Murphy precludes the argument on
which Johnson's appeal relies - that ineffective assistance of successive postconviction counsel can constitute sufficient reason to justify the filing of a second
successive petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908. Johnson therefore cannot show
that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition.

13

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
summarily dismissal of Johnson's second successive petition for post-conviction
relief.
DATED this 20th day of November, 2014.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of November, 2014, served
two true and correct copies of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by placing
the copies in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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